Abstract: With multilateral negotiations on free trade at a stand-still, all eyes are on further regional integration. By far the most important regional project lies in the Pacific, with the US led Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). If concluded, the TPP could establish an FTA spanning over forty percent of the global economy. Conclusion, however, is far from assured and subject to a number of uncertain variables, the most vexing of which is the role of China. If China joins the TPP it will not only augment the potential gains of the partnership, it will likely tip the scales, in favor, for the current negotiating partners. If China remains outside the block, it will likely try to put pressure on the negotiating partners, or at least make it harder for the US to get agreement on existing terms, by offering attractive alternatives. China's unclear trajectory is the motivation of our paper which asks, will China join the TPP? A number of prominent arguments and statements from high level officials suggest that China will indeed join the negotiations. However, in assessing each of these arguments in detail, we conclude that none are particularly robust and that China is unlikely to join the TPP negotiations, as it threatens to undermine both the political and economic reform strategy of the current administration. Instead, we predict that China will continue to promote constructive alternatives to the TPP, without directly challenging it, in the hope of delaying negotiations while maintaining good faith with the regional partners, including the United States.
diversion if it joins the TPP. The second argument concerns China's international reputation as a constructive regional player and a dedicated free market promoter. According to the international diplomacy argument, China's failure to join would undermine its reputation, giving regional economies further impetus for improving relations with the US instead. Moreover, proponents of the international diplomacy argument point out that, by joining negotiations now, China will have more leverage to negotiate its own terms than if it abstained and joined later, after the current members reach an agreement.
Finally, proponents point to China's domestic political environment, arguing that joining could help the current Xi administration push through declared reform objectives, much like WTO accession did for the previous Hu administration in the early 2000s.
In combination, the three arguments described above are compelling and suggest a clear TPPbound trajectory for China. Individually, however, none is particularly robust. With respect to the economic logic, we show that the gains from trade, as well as the potential losses from trade diversion, are actually not that substantial. Regarding the international diplomacy argument, while we agree that joining negotiations now provides China more bargaining power than accession to a finished agreement in the future, we also point out that China has alternative means by which to influence the negotiations, namely by offering alternatives to the TPP. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the long-delayed Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement (FTAAP), for example, are two key vehicles China is trying to maneuver in parallel to the TPP. 9 While China stresses that "together the different arrangements contribute to common goal of 'high quality' free trade in the Asia Pacific," it is difficult not to see the RCEP and the FTAAP as Chinese alternatives to the US-driven TPP. Moreover, we stress that, although China has an interest in projecting a market-friendly image, it is does not have an interest in joining an agreement not of its own making, especially not at a time when the leadership is trying to portray an image of a geo-politically resurgent China. Finally, with regards to domestic politics, we concede that joining the TPP would help the regime coordinate reform objectives. But, when we look at the actual reform strategies being employed by the current leadership, we find that comprehensive reform is not the goal, at least not right now. Instead, the push for localized Free Trade Zone's (FTZs), such as the recently inaugurated Shanghai FTZ, suggests a more gradual and politically calculated strategy that would be undermined by TPP obligations.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section one, we review existing IPE and IR arguments on regional integration and how they apply to China's relationship with the TPP. In section two, we address the economic rationale for China's joining the TPP by assessing the benefits it would enjoy by joining the TPP and inferring the costs it would incur should it not join. In section three, we address the international 9 (Lee 2014) diplomacy argument by juxtaposing the TPP against the RCEP and FTAAP trade arrangements, for which China has expressed strong support. In section four, we engage the domestic politics argument by evaluating China's current reform strategy from both an economic and political perspective. Based on this three-part analysis, we conclude that that China is unlikely join the TPP. Instead, we argue that China will most likely continue promoting alternatives to the TPP in the hope of slowing down negotiations while maintaining good faith with the regional partners, in particular the United States. In section five, we summarize our logic and offer our predictions for China's future involvement with the TPP and the various alternative regional trade arrangements.
I: The Political Economy of Regional Integration -China and the TPP
The TPP is billed as a "21 st " century trade agreement, replete with twenty-nine different chapters covering everything from tariffs to environmental quality. Indeed, the TPP aims to tackle a litany of trade-relevant topics that have been left out of previous trade agreements. In particular, the TPP is likely to impose stringent restrictions on competition from state-owned enterprises, business-friendly protections on intellectual property, and strict rules on government procurement as well new issues, like e-commerce and cloud computing. If they succeed, the TPP negotiations will have set the agenda for free trade standards for many years to come and will allow the US to set a lasting impression on the face of global trade.
Currently the TPP involves 12 negotiating partners: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. If it succeeds, the TPP will encompass roughly forty percent of the global economy. Combined with a potential twin agreement between the US and Europe, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the TPP poses to achieve much of what WTO negotiations failed to achieve during the Doha Round of negotiations (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . How likely is the TPP to be concluded? This, in large part, depends on the preferences of each individual member of the negotiations and what is being offered. As shown by Table 1 , the members of the TPP-12 are quite diverse in both economic size and income level. Unfortunately, it is difficult to provide a complete assessment of what is being offered, as the negotiating documents and draft chapters remain classified. Nevertheless, some details have been leaked -enough to confirm that the TPP will indeed be a very stringent and comprehensive agreement. Some of the more controversial aspects of the TPP include strict IPR provisions that may make pharmaceuticals in poorer members much more expensive and deregulation that hinder countries' efforts to maintain safety and environmental standards.
The TPP also includes language that will make it possible for companies and multinationals to sue governments if they believe their market access is being restricted. Potential applications of this might be by tobacco companies who disagree with government restrictions on cigarette advertising or oil companies who sue local authorities when they enact stricter environmental guidelines. 10 The agreement also seeks to impose strict regulations on the role of state-owned enterprises, so that they do not enjoy unfair access to licenses, contracts, or state finance. This will be difficult to swallow for countries in which the state-owned sector accounts for significant portions of the economy, like Vietnam, Singapore, and Malaysia. In Vietnam, at least, the potential gains from accessing the US apparel market unfettered appear to have won over the authoritarian communist party, but the ramifications of dismantling their SOEs are very hard to imagine.
At a more general level, we can look at the basic features of the negotiations for clues as to their eventual outcome. At the heart of any supranational agreement is the tradeoff between the benefits of coordination and the loss of independent policymaking authority. Generally, it is believed that the size and scope of a union is inversely related to the degree of heterogeneity between the countries inside it. A union that involves too many activities will be favored by few and a union which focuses on a narrow set of core activities will be favored by many (Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro 2001) . In other words, we should expect two types of unions: small ones that coordinate a lot, or large ones that coordinate very little.
Applying this logic to the TPP suggests a clear source of tension; the TPP involves a large and diverse set of countries (including the world's leading economies) but seeks to coordinate an unprecedented range of activities.
Why is the US sponsoring another uncertain free trade arrangement? The short answer is that the United States has always been a force for FTAs. Beginning in the 1980s, following failed GATT negotiations in 1982, the United States brokered its first post-war bilateral trade agreements with Israel in 1985 and Canada in 1989 (Panagariya 1999 . In the early 1990s, some believe that President Clinton's push on NAFTA and upgrading of talks with APEC put pressure on the European economies to come to an agreement on the Uruguay Round of WTO talks (Haggard 1997; Bergsten 1994) . With the conclusion of the Uruguay round in 1994, US interest in RTAs appeared to have subsided. Yet, recent deadlock at Doha has once again prompted the US to seek out regional strategies with willing partners, the most prominent of which is the TPP.
11 10 (Pilling and Donnan 2013) 11 The US is also pursuing a parallel free trade agreement with Europe, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or TTIP. Although TTIP covers a larger share of global trade than the TTP, due to relatively low preexisting tariff rates between the US and Europe, the agreement's potential impact is actually smaller than that of the TPPs.
The TPP, however, represents more than just another RTA for the United States. As described by members of the Obama administration, including President Obama himself, the TPP is central to the American "rebalance" towards Asia. 12 Integration may also lead to non-trade spillovers and a need for policy coordination among members, further cementing their co-dependence and common interests. For example, regional trade agreements, like Mercosur and NAFTA, have encouraged cooperation on a wide range of legal and institutional dimensions. The hope is that something similar will occur in Asia Pacific, allowing the US to further cement its indispensible role in the region.
The high aspirations of the TPP have contributed to its protracted negotiations, but they also set the TPP apart from any previous arrangements. Unlike any existing agreements, 13 the TPP integrates trade, investment, and dispute resolution into one common package. As a result, the TPP is commonly described as the "gold standard" of RTAs, one that satisfies the core remaining challenges to free trade in the region, including government procurement, intellectual property and competition from state-owned enterprises. The TPP also covers issues that did not exist during the Uruguay rounds, like e-commerce and cloud computing, as well as issues that are not directly related to trade, such as labor standards and environmental protection. As such, even if TPP negotiations lead to further concessions on free flows of goods, a high bar has been set and it is unlikely to come down too far.
Nevertheless, as a RTA, the TPP will never be as effective as a multilateral agreement because, even though it generates trade-liberalizing benefits for member economies, it risks diverting trade from those excluded from the RTA (Bhagwati and Panagariya 1996) . In principle, therefore, the TPP goes against stated US objectives on multilateral free trade promotion. For practical reasons, however, the TPP makes a lot of sense as it allows those countries with the greatest interest in free trade to negotiate privately. At the same time, the rigor of the TPP may make it difficult for some of the negotiating partners -even the United States -to comply. For example, the TPP calls for expansion of union rights when less than eighteen percent of US industry is unionized. Getting a diverse set of countries, including communist Vietnam and a cautious Japan, to all agree on the TPP provisions will be very difficult.
Already, Japan has lobbied for and received concessions on its "five sacred products", rice, barley and wheat, sugar, dairy, and beef and pork. 14 As the negotiations enter their twentieth round, further watering down is expected.
The compromises the US may have to make if the TPP is adopted are modest in respect to the gains it stands to make by prying open the pacific economies. Negotiations between big and small 12 Previously, the "rebalance" towards Asia was referred to as the Asia "pivot," a term that has been largely discontinued due to its somewhat confrontational connotation. 13 See (Panagariya 1999) States (Dien 2013) and new defense agreement with the Philippines.
Regional enthusiasm for the TPP can be attributed, at least in part, to a similar logic, i.e., entering into a preferential trade agreement with the United States helps balance the impending weight of China's economic rise. Yet, it is nearsighted to think that China's neighbors will simply balance away from China and ignore the market opportunities described earlier. China is an extremely important economic player in the region. Although Japan still dominates intraregional trade, China's shares are growing fast. China is the largest regional importer of parts and components and a major importer of commodities. China is also deeply enmeshed in regional production-sharing arrangements and, although the majority of this trade has been with East Asia, China's trade with ASEAN has soared over the last two decades.
Currently, China absorbs roughly twelve percent of ASEAN exports. More importantly, China is emerging as an important source of FDI to the region, surpassing the US as the regions second largest investor after Japan (see Table 2 ). As China restructures its economy away from export-driven manufacturing and toward more high-tech industries and domestic consumption, the value of good relations with China will only increase.
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China's leaders know this and they are unlikely to be perturbed by the recent warming of ties between its neighbors and the U.S. As China's Foreign Minister, Qin Gang, said last April, "China is right here whether [the US] comes or not." 18 As such, the current economic environment surrounding TPP negotiations offers plenty of reasons why the TPP negotiators want China in the mix; they do not explain why China itself would want to join. This is not to say that there are not reasons for China to want to join. This thought in mind, we proceed, in the next three sections, to assess specific arguments suggesting that China is likely to join TPP negotiations, namely, economic opportunity, international signaling, and domestic politics. We will argue that none of these arguments is particularly robust.
II: China's Economic Stake in the TPP
The TPP poses to be the most substantial free trade agreement ( 
Estimating the Gains and Losses of Joining for China
Much of the gain from an FTA comes from trade creation, as originally identified by Viner (1950) . Trade creation occurs when a member of the FTA begins to import from an FTA partner a good that it previously produced for itself. Since it would do so only if the partner produces it more cheaply than it can itself, both it and the partner benefit from this exchange in terms of the cost of the country's total consumption (Deardorff 2013) . Offsetting the gains to FTA members from trade creation are losses from trade diversion. Trade diversion occurs when a member country imports from a partner a good that it previously imported from a third (non-member) country. Because both countries previously faced the same tariff, we can assume that imports from the third country were due to lower cost. Sourcing from the partner country rather than the third country, therefore, means purchasing a higher cost good. As
Deardorff (2013) Petri, Plummer, and Zhai (2012 Zhai ( , 2014 ) use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework to gauge the magnitude of possible welfare gains from conclusion of a TPP agreement. The model they use is novel, specially developed by Zhai (2008) to incorporate firm-level differences in productivity, detailing 24 regions and 18 sectors and modified for the specific trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific.
Without China, countries joining the TPP will benefit through the creation of trade among its members, enhancing average productivity, expanding consumer variety, and increasing price competition.
For the TPP-12, Petri, Plummer, and Zhai (2014) Table 3 ). Peru. Nearly all exports and imports to those members are already subject to zero tariffs, so that no tariffrelated trade diversion will occur.
But this leaves Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, and the United States as TPP members with whom China has no FTA and where it can expect a decline of exports due to trade diversion. By 2007, the United States was the most important individual-country market for Chinese exports and Japan the third largest (Dean, Lovely, and Mora 2009). These important bilateral flows suggest that China would experience major losses from trade diversion as a non-member of the TPP. However, as shown in Figure   1 , average MFN tariffs in all TPP countries on merchandise trade are already low and this partly accounts for the small estimated losses to China through trade diversion. Nevertheless, the small magnitude of the trade diversion estimated by Petri, Plummer, and Zhai (2014) is surprising given that the TPP reduces barriers on trade in agriculture and services, two areas where China still faces significant barriers. procedures; and prohibition on performance requirements such as mandatory export levels and local content stipulations (Fergusson et al. 2013, p.40) . While some sectors have migrated away from China, a second look at Figure 2 suggests that this investment diversion cannot be large relative to the total inflow. First, the size of foreign investment flows into China dwarfs flows into any middle or low-income country in the TPP-12. Secondly, the size of these alternative economies is small relative to the size of potentially deflected investment flows. As shown earlier in Table 1 , only Mexico has a gross domestic product that exceeded US$1 trillion in 2012, in comparison to FDI inflows to China in the same year of almost US$ 300 billion. Moreover, Mexico is an unlikely alternative for production that will receive further processing in East Asia since it is not within the region. Finally, Mexico's manufacturing wages exceed those of China.
Beginning in initial openings through Special Export
In addition to investor protections, through the TPP the United States seeks intellectual property rights (IPR) protections that "reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in U.S. law" and which exceed those provided for in the WTO Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement (Fergusson et al., 2013, p.34 ). Because such "TRIPS plus" provisions are seen as investor friendly, there is again concern that a failure by China to join the TPP negotiations will diminish its attraction as a location for export-processing investment. 
Section III: International Diplomacy
Another commonly proposed argument for why China is likely to join the TPP is that it needs to signal its commitment to free trade and its desire to become a more sophisticated economic player. The TPP is, by far, a 'higher quality' agreement than anything China already has in place, so
should not be compared with the existing arrangements. However, it is not at all clear whether China is interested in, or even capable of subscribing to all these high standards. Indeed, China has criticized the "one size fits all" approach to the TPP negotiations, by pointing out that there are developed as well as developing countries at the negotiation table and that it is unreasonable to expect that they all agree on the same issues. Moreover, China has been busy marketing alternative arrangements that appeal to developing economies in the region. While China's efforts are unlikely to derail the TPP negotiations, their entreaties are resonating with some ASEAN members. During the inaugural 2013 US-ASEAN summit, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak stated that a more flexible approach was needed in future trade negotiations, as ASEAN members were not simply "yes men." 28 In a rare case of common opinion, Anwar Ibrahim, the Malaysian opposition leader, has also come out in criticism of the TPP as an attempt by the US "to impose its brand of economic model" on unwilling countries. In Japan as well, the country's chief TPP negotiator has subtly pointed out that the TPP provides a blank check on monetary policy but imposes strict restrictions on exchange rate policy, terms that seem to benefit the United States at the expense of exporters.
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China's push for TPP alternatives, or is it likes to refer to them: "complements," has a simple sales pitch, namely, TPP-like trade coordination without the TPP-level of stringency. China hopes to advance a "win-win" approach to integration that focuses on investment in infrastructure rather than rigid 27 As of early 2012, China has signed BTAs with ten countries/regions: Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, Pakistan, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru and Costa Rica, and is negotiating with Australia, Iceland, South Korea, Norway, Switzerland, as well as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 28 http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201310100071 29 (Obe 2014) institutionalization. China has even appealed to the noodle bowl analogy by arguing that there are too many FTAs and BTAs in the region (even though a large portion of them involve China) and that a new mega-FTA would actually simplify matters. 30 As contradictory as these claims may seem, it is helpful to approach the Chinese alternatives for what they are: more attractive versions of the TPP.
What exactly is China putting its weight behind? First, China is actively promoting the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) for East Asia, which would include the ten ASEAN members, Australia, India, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and of course China. Unlike the TPP, RCEP is very much a regionally motivated idea, not a meeting of like-minded economies. RCEP regional character represents both its strength and its weakness. China, for instance, likes to stress the point that RCEP is grounded in ASEAN centrality and that "close neighbors are better than distant relatives." This message is likely to resonate with those in Southeast Asia who are dissatisfied with the selective annexation of ASEAN economies into the TPP. RCEP's regional mandate also gives it the flexibility of incorporating India, which has also been left out of the TPP negotiations. The regional motive, however, also makes RCEP a less feasible configuration due to the diverse set of interests it needs to accommodate.
To put it in slightly different words, RCEP is attractive for the region but it is unlikely to get off the ground any time soon, even if China is leaning on it. Yet, if China is simply interested in using RCEP to slow down TPP negotiations, attractiveness trumps urgency.
On this count, RCEP has several enticing features. For example, China has raised the prospect of flexible of rules of origin (ROOs) for RCEP, which would allow products to circulate seamlessly across countries during their production cycle. RCEP would also allow members to ease into liberalization by allowing for sector-specific reductions. For example, RCEP members could focus initial efforts on sectors, such as tourism and textiles, which are relatively to easy to expose and tend to generate quick returns. Such provisions, even if they are unlikely to materialize any time soon, complicate the TPP process, which promises to adopt strict ROOs and blanket tariff reductions, though recent concessions to Japan suggest that the blanket may have some holes in it.
In addition to RCEP, China is also trying to speed up negotiations regarding the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), which poses to be the largest RTA in history, both in terms of geographic and economic size. Under the "Yokohama Vision," articulated during the 2010 APEC summit, FTAAP would be a natural progression from TPP and RCEP that would encompass all the APEC member countries, accounting for about 60% of the global economy. This is by far the broadest and least feasible of the three arrangements. elections-is in charge in China, meaning that its ability to form and ratify international agreements is much less constrained than that of any of its more democratic negotiating partners (Putnam 1988) .
However, China's CCP leadership is not a monolithic force. The country is highly fragmented, both administratively and geographically (Lampton and Lieberthal 1986; Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 1995; Xu 2009 ), as well as along factional lines (Nathan 1973; Shih 2004; Cai and Treisman 2006) .
Increasingly, scholars are also including the role of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as a major interest group in Chinese domestic politics (Minxin 2006; Steinfeld 2000) .
When it comes to free trade, these forces have rarely been in alignment. SOEs and the local governments that depend on them, for instance, have a lot to lose and little to gain from further liberalization, either in trade or investment. As a consequence, we can expect SOEs to resist any comprehensive RTA, especially the TPP, which carries specific provisions aimed at countering unfair competition from SOEs. Interestingly, however, the current administration has made SOE reform a top priority. During the Chinese Communist Party's 3 rd Plenum, held in November 2013, Xi Jinping made it clear that he envisions market forces to play a leading role in the future of China's economy, read: SOEs will play a smaller role. Whether the administration will be successful in this effort is far from clear.
China's domestic political constraints are unlikely to manifest in the same way as those of the United States. That is to say, provincial delegates are unlikely to challenge a TPP initiative in the National People's Congresses (NPC), China's preeminent legislative institution; nor are SOE lobbies likely to organize demonstrations against the elimination of protections that ensure them valuable profits.
The pressure of domestic politics in China works its way behind the scene, making it extremely difficult to predict how local politics or special interests will influence China's entry into the TPP. What can be 36 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/08cf74f6-c216-11e2-8992-00144feab7de.html#axzz2U9X6IlJK
said, however, is that these forces have prevented China's leaders from implementing much needed reforms in the past (Minxin 2006) . For example, the Hu-Wen administration (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) was expected by many to be the most reform-minded administration in the PRC's history. By the end of 2012, however, most anticipated reforms, such as SOE liberalization and bank reform, had made zero, perhaps even negative, progress-leading many China scholars to bill the Hu-Wen period a "Lost Decade" for reform.
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The current Xi-Li administration appears considerably more assertive and consolidated than its predecessor, suggesting that, if the leadership wanted TPP, it might stand a better chance of forcing it onto sub-national administration and even on the SOEs. Many even argue that joining the TPP would help the regime achieve its reform objectives. They base these claims on a literature that shows how joining trade agreements can create pressure for domestic reform. For example (Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder 2000; Whalley 1998) show that joining NAFTA put pressure on Mexican officials to remove agricultural protections in order to take full advantage of the trade agreement. The argument is not foreign to the Chinese case either. Zhu Rongji, for instance, is believed to have leveraged WTO accession to push through (Zweig 2001 ) and lock-in (Fewsmith 2001 ) economic reforms in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Similarly, Japan's Shinzo, has billed the TPP as a "third arrow" in his quiver of reform for the Japanese economy (one and two being monetary and fiscal policy). Could the TPP serve a similar purpose under Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang? This is a compelling thesis, but it is not one that is supported by the regime's current approach to reform.
Rather than calling for broad reaching reforms, as Zhu did in 1998, the current administration has proposed a more nuanced approach towards easing SOE's out of the production economy, not just by selling them off, but by reorienting their interests towards investment (Kroeber 2013) . In particular, as outlined in the sixty-point addendum to the Third Plenum Communiqué, the leadership wants SOEs to reorient assets away from manufacturing and distribution and towards investing in private businesses operating within their sectors. 38 This politically tactful approach allows the SOEs to preserve much of their wealth and to further cultivate their sectoral patronage networks while also discouraging them from production, where they have proven to be increasingly inefficient (Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti 2011) .
Whether large SOEs will buy into this strategy and whether or not it will lead to improvements in private sector productivity is still unknown. What is clear, however, is that this approach would be undermined by a TPP-style trade agreement, which would require China to expose sectors to unfettered foreign investment, thereby undercutting the appeal of the reorientation strategy for SOEs. Given that many of China's large SOEs operate in politically sensitive industries, like telecom, media, finance, and energy, it 37 (Johnson 2014) 38 ("The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms" 2013) is unlikely the regime will give up protections on these sectors anytime soon nor is it likely to forfeit the power to channel investment and patronage within these lucrative sectors.
The desire to move incrementally and selectively is even more visible in China's approach to To help understand why the TPP conflicts with China's current reform strategy, it is helpful to look back at the Deng Xiao Ping's approach to reform during the 1980s. At the time, Deng faced an entrenched bureaucracy that survived on the planning model, resistant to any attempt at reforming it.
Deng, could have, if he had wanted to, taken the bureaucracy head-on. Instead, he chose to encircle it through what Susan Shirk calls, "particularistic contracting" (Shirk 1993, 15) . This involved cutting deals with particular parts of the bureaucracy in exchange for support on further reforms. In the case of price reform, for example, Deng offered dual-track pricing that allowed prices to rationalize while giving select portions of the bureaucracy access to below-market rates. While it was obvious this setup would incentivize corruption through arbitrage, it nevertheless allowed Deng to build and dismantle reform coalitions with limited resistance.
Deng's particularistic contracting was even more pronounced in the designation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Shenzhen, Tianjin, Dalian and Xiamen. As with price reforms, Deng selectively handed out SEZ status as a way of building support and preempting opposition to further reform (Crane 1990; Shirk 1993) . Moreover, by focusing on these select locations, Deng was able to channel central resources to insure that the SEZs were exceptionally successful, so as to foster envy among those who had not been selected (Shirk 1993 Guangzhou. 41 It is unlikely that the leadership will abandon this strategy by signing on to the TPP.
Another political strategy that might be compromised by a rigid TPP is China's Western Development Initiative, sometimes referred to as the "Go West" policy, intended to accelerate the development and narrow the gap between the western and eastern provinces on income, investment, production, and education. Part of this policy involves building up infrastructure connecting China's western hinterlands with the dynamic coastal cities in the East. The policy also entails various efforts at creating preferential investment opportunities for both domestic and foreign firms who invest in the West, including tax breaks, fast-track registration, and, unfortunately, weaker regulation. 42 There are political and economic reasons for the CCP's push towards the West. Politically, the western provinces, especially Xinjiang, Tibet, Gansu, and Sichuan, contain are some of the more restive regions in the country. While oppressive government policies are partly to blame, so is excessive poverty which is much more prevalent in the Western provinces. Economically, this is also an opportunity as wages in western China are still 40 (Han 2014) 41 (Inman, Deng, and Hong 2014) 42 for further background see: (Tian 2004; Ziran 2002) low, about seventy percent of that in the east. 43 Things were much worse, however, before the western development policy came into effect and policymakers can take some credit for that. For example, poverty in western China has fallen by more than half (over 30 million people) since 2000. State-led investment and policy incentives also appear to have been successful in attracting increasing amounts of foreign investment. Observing rates of change from 2005 through 2012, we see that western provinces had the fastest growth across China (see Figure 3) . While it is unclear how this picture would have differed based on purely market-led investment, it is unlikely that China's leaders are ready to give up these powerful policy levers when they appear to be bearing fruit. China surpassed both primary and manufacturing (see Figure 4) . Unfortunately, China's service sector is less productive than the manufacturing sector and therefore more vulnerable to foreign competition (Nabar and Yan 2013 
V: Summary and Predictions
This paper assesses the prospects of China's joining the current TPP negotiations, a move that would vastly alter and augment the impact of an agreement as well as the likelihood that it will be successfully concluded. In particular, Chinese involvement would likely both slow down and water down the current TPP negotiations but it would also expand the TPP's economic girth to roughly fifty-five percent of global GDP and offer the current TPP negotiating partners a much more enticing reason to sign off on the agreement: preferential access to China's budding domestic market. Without indulging in the merits of another regional trade agreement, on which opinions are hotly divided, we address the various existing arguments for why China is or is not likely to join. Having found many of the former and few of the latter, we provide our own responses to why a TPP with China in it is unlikely. Specifically, we address three arguments commonly raised as to why China is likely to join, namely, that it would be economically prudent for it do so, that it would be diplomatically prudent for it do so, and that it would be strategically prudent to do so with respect to China's domestic political environment.
With respect to each of the argument outlined above, we concede that the claims are valid but not significant enough to be convincing. Moreover, we point out that these arguments miss important features of China's approach to diplomacy and domestic politicking. In particular, we point out that although China does indeed stand to lose out from not joining in the TPP negotiations, its losses are predictable and negligible but its short-term costs are indeterminate and potentially quite large. With respect to diplomacy, we concede that China's failure to join in TPP negotiations may undermine China's reputation as a free marketer and put it in a weaker position should it choose to join the TPP after its finalized, but we also point out that China's has alternative avenues through which to lay its stake on free market politics and parallel levers from which to put pressure on the TPP negotiations, even if it is not in the negotiating room. Finally, while we agree that joining the TPP would serve as a powerful weapon in the current Chinese administrations fight against entrenched SOEs and obstinate bureaucrats, we cannot ignore the valuable patronage the administration would forfeit should it forgo its current piecemeal approach to reform and adopt the TPPs blanket provisions on trade and investment.
While we arrive at an unambiguous conclusion -China will not join the TPP negotiations -we should also point out that from our perspective, this is not a big deal. China is so deeply embedded in the global supply chain, and in particular with nearly all the TPP negotiating partners, that it will be indirectly included in the TPP whether or not it is a formal member. This does not mean that the TPP members will not lose out from not having China as a member. They will. Yet, even then these losses are unlikely to last for long. China is actively pursuing alternative arrangements with virtually all the TPP member states and as long as the TPP negotiations remain in motion, so will these parallel arrangements. The end-game outcomes of all this may in fact turn out to be a broader, albeit less stringent, free trade area that includes many important but currently excluded economies, like India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Russia. India, for one, has never before been invited to regional summits, but China has upped the ante so to speak by inviting the current Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, to the APEC summit this coming November in Beijing and by making sure that India is party to the ongoing RCEP negotiations. This has added pressure on the US to extend its own overtures to the world's third largest economy.
Involving India, just like involving China, compromises the US's vision of a higher standards FTA. It also lowers the prospects of a successful TPP conclusion arriving any time soon. This is perhaps precisely the point. China's dilemma is that the best case scenario for China is not a world without TPP, just a world where TPP makes a slower and softer landing, arriving ideally after the current leadership has consolidated its grip on power and around the same time it is able to cement a parallel agreement that cancels out America's leading role in Asian free trade. This, of course, is not what the US is interested in and we can be sure that the Obama administration will press ahead in full force over the next year as it tries to reach a deal on TPP before the start of election season next summer. But as it presses ahead the US negotiators may want to pay more attention to how their Chinese counterparts are interpreting their moves and readapting their own. To this end at least, the US approach to TPP has been surprisingly effective in so far as it has managed to keep China positively engaged in the region and focused on winning over partners rather throwing its weight around. As John Ikenberry pointed out, "The United
States cannot thwart China's rise, but it can help ensure that China's power is exercised within the rules and institutions that the United States and its partners have crafted." 46 In the case of the TPP, even though China is not party to the institutions, it is moving along a similar path as it tries to market its own parallel agreements. 
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